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This study identifies factors that influence primacy between generations in the management structure of U.S. 
family farms. The paper fills an important gap in the farm succession literature by exploring succession (in 
management of the farm) as an incremental process. Estimation with cross-sectional data from the USDA-
ERS’ Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) and a limited dependent variable model is used to 
explain the decision for older generation operators to retain primary farm management duties with a junior 
operator serving a secondary role. We identify a number of statistically significant attributes that explain 
variation in the elder farmer’s role (primary versus secondary) in management of the farm. Our results suggest 
that transferring primary operator status is more influenced by family members’ characteristics and less so by 
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Introduction 
  U.S. agriculture in the twentieth century evidenced dramatic change. Advances in technology 
and increased connections between rural locations and urban labor markets simultaneously 
combined to greatly reduce the number of occupational farmers and the size of the farm population 
even as agricultural output steadily grew (Huffman, 1991; Mishra and El-Osta, 2008). These factors 
significantly changed the structure of agriculture in the United States to its current form, with a 
relatively small percentage of farms producing the majority of agricultural output (and receiving a 
majority of agricultural income). The structure of U.S. farming continues to be an important policy 
concern. Political rhetoric surrounding farm program subsidies nearly always makes an appeal to 
support for family farms. This is a common theme in the developed world where agriculture 
commands a small share of economic activity and speaks directly to the general population’s 
tendency to disfavor corporate management of countryside resources and acceptance that rural 
communities should be sustained (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001; McNally, 2001). 
  Huffman (1991) identifies the two main avenues through which rural farm population is lost 
as: 1) exit of the farm operator to the off-farm job market and 2) the failure of the family farm to 
pass on management to the next generation. The first of these choices has been covered in an 
extensive literature dating back to Huffman (1980) and Sumner (1982). The second of Huffman’s 
avenues relates to the general problem of intergenerational farm succession which has been dealt 
with more sporadically in the literature and is the subject of this paper. The literature on farm 
succession and its determinants suffers most notably from the lack of quality longitudinal data that 
tracks families’ decisions over time up to and following the transfer of management and assets. The 
transfer of management and assets is itself an issue confounding the determinants of succession 
since it is quite possible that assets, responsibility, and claims on earnings pass across generations at 
different points in time and for different motives (Westhead, Howorth, and Cowling, 2002).  
The succession decision is often modeled as a full exit/full entry decision, with the 
succeeding operator wholly replacing the previous operator at the point of succession. In point of 
fact, succession takes place over time in most instances, with some (perhaps extensive) period of 
time in which two operators from differing generations manage the farm business together. This 
manner of viewing the succession decision is highly consistent with the continued increase in U.S. 
farm size and the concordant increase in multiple operator farms (Hoppe, 2005; ERS, 2005). With 
this in mind, data on farm operations and their multiple operators provides a natural vehicle for 
shedding new light on the process of farm succession and by extension determinants of farm 
structure. 
  We use this vehicle to analyze multiple farm operator households and their choice of which 
generation bears primary responsibility for management of the farm business. Thus, we view the 
succession decision as a welfare maximizing outcome in which the younger generation operator 
assumes primacy in management decisions due to a collective rational choice of management 
structure. In the next section, we review relevant literature on family business succession decisions 
and how these relate to farm structure and policy. We follow that with discussion of our modeling 
approach and data, highlighting the differences in our approach from previous literature. The final 
two sections report estimation results and implications of the findings. [2] 
 
Background 
  Decision-making in family firms is often characterized by a horizon that extends into the 
succeeding generation’s management term. Several factors contribute to this extended planning 
horizon including active management participation by the younger generation and the objective of 
the senior generation to see the family business survive into the future. The family business literature 
highlights the complexity of the issue focusing in particular on firm survival and how it is influenced 
by timing of management transfer and the qualifications of successors (Kimhi, 1997). Recent work 
in the business literature has focused narrowly on family versus non-family succession and 
subsequent business performance when management control changes hands. These studies tend to 
find that family firms experience a decline in performance following succession by next generation 
family members. This initial waning is attributable to family entrenchment in decision-making 
leading to a lack of innovation and the conflicts that occur between family objectives and 
competitive business interests (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Hillier and McColgan, 2009). 
  This finding is not completely general. In particular, certain family enterprises may realize 
significant post-succession gains from family member involvement. Incentive structures for 
succeeding family members are somewhat free of agency problems that detract from long run 
sustainability. Also, where business success depends significantly on firm specific knowledge (i.e. 
human capital), the extended apprenticeship period that can occur in a family business succession 
may contribute positively to successful management transition (Hillier and McColgan, 2009). As we 
begin to think about farm business succession, this possibility is particularly significant since human 
capital that is specific to a particular farm (e.g. that farm’s stock of soil qualities or livestock genetics) 
may be an important qualification in choosing a successor (Leband and Lentz, 1983). Importantly, 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) are unable to distinguish a gap in performance following succession by a 
family member in industries with the highest prevalence of family succession such as agriculture. 
Thus, farm business succession reasonably emerges as a special case of the more general concept 
and has spawned its own relevant literature. 
  The life cycle view of the farm business has long been a standard approach to viewing farm 
productivity (Tauer, 1995). In this view, farm operators reach peak productivity at middle age 
(between 35 and 44 according to Tauer’s estimates) due to both physical and human capital 
accumulation. Beyond this peak, farm productivity will tend to fall for a variety of reasons including 
the mismatch that may occur between vintages of innovation driven physical capital and human 
capital present in the aging farm operator. For this and other reasons, the age structure of the farm 
population maintains as a going policy concern that can often be addressed by co-management of 
the farm operation by operators from different generations. In particular, the financial capital 
accumulated to the senior operator may be more complementary with the younger generation’s 
knowledge of agricultural technology (general human capital) (Tauer, 1995). 
  This co-management period may occur despite the lack of an actual farm succession, often 
defined via formal plans (via asset transfer). This occurrence is due to the fact that senior farm 
operators often tend to choose the timing for wholesale transfers associated with succession (assets 
and full management control) as well as when to retire from full-time work (Kimhi and Lopez, 
1999). With succession so closely related to the choice of retirement of the senior operator, most of 
the literature on farm family succession has focused on attributes of the operator to be succeeded 
and the characteristics of the farm to be passed on in management and ownership.  
  Notable in this literature are studies of household surveys in which a farm operator is asked 
to respond as to whether they have a succession plan currently in place. Based on this binary choice [3] 
 
question, some limited dependent variable econometric investigation follows describing which 
attributes influence the probability of having a succession plan. For farms in the United States, 
Mishra and El-Osta (2007) conduct just such an analysis and are able to identify the importance of 
both operator characteristics (age, education, number of children) and farm characteristics (size, 
debt, structure) in their influence on succession plan probability. Apart from these standard 
characteristics, government farm subsidies and location also have been shown to have a significant 
impact on succession probabilities (Mishra and El-Osta, 2008). The location differences in 
succession are particularly of interest as they likely reflect regional differences in dominant livestock 
and crop enterprises on those farms. Other studies have shown that high time-demand enterprises 
such as dairy farming will tend to have higher succession due to the prevalence of multiple operators 
on the farm operation (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001; Wolf, 2003). 
  As previously mentioned the use of a single cross-section of data for conducting analysis of 
succession is problematic and has limited empirical analysis of U.S. farm succession to estimates of 
the probability of a succession plan being in place. Studies with repeated cross-sections have added 
to the body of knowledge by showing the importance of the actual timing in which farm 
management transfers across generations. In particular, characteristics of both the senior and 
succeeding farm operator (and their families) will be of importance in the succession decision. 
Individual objectives across generations may be in conflict due to the opportunity costs associated 
with each generation’s alternatives. For instance, a senior operator may need to transfer to a highly 
educated child sooner than would be optimal from an on-farm experience standpoint merely 
because of the potential for non-farm employment. Kimhi (1994) is able to confirm this intuition 
empirically using repeated census data, showing that cp a more educated heir in Israel succeeds the 
senior operator at a younger age than one who is less educated.  
  Our approach to modeling succession detailed in the next section represents a hybrid of the 
single cross-section estimates on the probability of an in-place succession plan (e.g. Mishra and El-
Osta, 2008) and the repeated cross-section analysis of farms that have changed hands (e.g. Kimhi, 
1994). We next further conceptualize this approach and present the available data for modeling. 
 
Model and Data 
In this paper, we restrict our analysis to farms that currently have two operators (set apart by 
at least twenty years of age) on the farm and use characteristics of both operators in explaining our 
outcome variable. The outcome variable we key on is the generation (elder vs. younger) which has 
primary management responsibility for the farm as determined by response in the household survey. 
The tie to the farm succession decision of our outcome variable is then a natural extension of the 
apprenticeship period view on family business succession (Westhead, Howorth, and Cowling, 2002; 
Tauer, 1995). Here we model the likelihood that a family farm has not yet reached the point where 
the stream of marginal benefits of the younger generation assuming primary management 
responsibility outweighs the marginal cost of removing the senior person from management.  
Figure 1 illustrates the transition of management responsibility over time between the elder 
and younger generation of family member operators. Initially, the elder operator assumes the 
majority of managerial responsibility. Over time, the elder operator relaxes his managerial duties 
while the younger operator eventually assumes a primary management role. Preceding studies 
observed data focusing solely on the primary operator looking ahead to the time of management 
transition (i.e. upper, left corner of the graph). Other studies evaluated the characteristics of a family 
farm before and after succession took place (i.e. the upper tier of the graph). By focusing on farms [4] 
 
that currently have two operators, where the primary operator may be either the older generation 
and younger generation, we are able to combat the limited analysis of the single cross-section data of 
those studies and observe data of both the primary and secondary operator before and after the 
transition of management responsibilities has taken place. Thus, our analysis can be viewed as a 
complementary contribution to those studies of U.S. succession that observes the likelihood of an 
in-place succession plan. 
 
Data 
Data for this analysis are from the 2002 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). 
The Economic Research Service and the National Agricultural Statistics Service conducts the survey 
in an effort to collect data measuring the financial position and operating characteristics of farm 
businesses and to evaluate the welfare of farm households. The survey is distributed annually to 
operators associated with family-owned farm businesses in the 48 contiguous states. Data are 
collected from the primary operator of the farm who makes most of the day-to-day decisions. For 
the purpose of this study, we limited the data to only those farms that were family-owned and –
operated (i.e. we excluded non-family corporations and farms run by hired managers). 
 
Variables 
The dependent variable represents the generation (elder vs. younger) which has primary 
management responsibility for the farm as determined by response in the household survey. A farm 
household classification (Keeney, Remble, Ogle, 2010) oriented toward the managerial organization 
of the farm business was referenced to separate the farms in these two categories. The typology, 
constructed using ARMS data, first separate family-operated farms into those managed under one 
operator and those managed under multiple operators. The farms in the latter category were again 
separated into clusters contingent on whether there existed more than 20 years of age between the 
primary and secondary operators. If the 20 year age gap is evident, these operators are assumed to be 
from subsequent generations.  It was then determined which generation served as primary operator. 
For our analysis, the dependent variable was coded “1” if the elder generation still remained as the 
primary decision maker.  The variable was coded “0” if the younger generation held the primary 
management responsibility, thus indicating that the management transfer decision had already taken 
place. To analyze this dichotomous variable, we use a limited dependent variable regression to 
explain differences in farm and family characteristics, financial indicators, and human capital. The 
variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 1. 
The first group of regressors that are expected to have an effect on the probability that the 
elder operator remains as the primary operator are the variables representing the human capital 
characteristics of both the elder and younger operators. These include age, education, off-farm work, 
and the experience of the younger operator on the farm. Increases in age of both the elder and 
younger operator (OLDAGE, YNGAGE respectively) is expected to initially decrease the likelihood 
of the elder generation acting as primary operator, as parents look toward retiring and children 
become older and more suitable to make management decisions. The education level of the elder 
generation operator, OLDED, is represented as a binary variable, with “0” indicating the elder 
operator completed some college or less and “1” indicating they achieved a four-year college degree 
or higher. The effect the education level of the elder operator has on whether they remain as the 
primary manager or not is uncertain. For example, more educated parents have a better ability to [5] 
 
evaluate the benefits of timely succession (Kimhi 1995). This could possibly trigger an earlier 
transfer process, resulting in a negative relationship between education and the dependent variable. 
On the other hand, educated parents can negotiate a later succession time with their potential 
successors, implying a positive relationship between the elder operator’s education and their time 
spent as primary operator. The education of the younger operator, YNGED, is also represented as a 
binary variable, following the same format as the OLDED variable. The younger operator’s 
education is expected to be positively related to farms where the elder operator remains as the 
primary operator as more educated offspring have more opportunities to pursue other career paths.  
The off-farm work days of both operators (OLDOFF, YNGOFF respectively) is expected 
to have a significant effect on which operator assumes primary management responsibilities. 
However, the effect of off-farm work is ambiguous. If the elder operator works extensively off the 
farm, the farm may be considered a part-time farm, in which case a successor is needed less (Kimhi, 
1995).Conversely, an older farmer who works extensively off the farm, may need another operator 
to take a more primary role. The amount of days the younger operator works off the farm is 
expected to have a positive relationship with farms where the elder operator makes the majority of 
day-to-day decision. This falls under the idea that a younger operator who works extensively off the 
farm has pursued other career paths. Both variables representing the off-farm work days of the two 
operators were converted to binary variables where “1” indicates if the operator has worked 50 or 
more days of four hours of more off the farm. The variable YNGEXP represents the years of 
experience the younger generation has on being an operator of the farm. This is expected to have a 
negative effect on the dependent variable as a more experienced young-generation operator would 
be suited to take on more managerial duties. 
The second group of regressors is used to evaluate family characteristics that may have an 
influence on whether the younger operator has taken a primary role on the farm. OLDHSIZE 
represents the number of member living in the household of the elder operator. The effect of this 
variable on the dependent variable is uncertain. More household members may increase the 
likelihood that one of the operator’s children would prefer to take over managerial duties. On the 
other hand, having more than one child interested in succeeding could delay the transfer process as 
the elder operator may need more time to choose his primary successor. The household size of the 
younger operator, YNGHSIZE, is predicted to have a negative effect on the probability that the 
elder operator is the primary operator as a younger operator with more dependents is assumed to 
have a greater need to provide for their family and establish a secure career for the future. 
The third group of regessors describes farm characteristics that may have an influence on 
whether the elder operator has a more important role in day-to-day decisions. Farms that specialize 
in dairy are more likely to an appointed successor because of its extensive labor requirements and 
rigorous time demand. This suggests that there is a negative relationship between dairy farms and a 
farm that is managed primarily by an elder generation operator. A binary variable, DDAIRY, was 
created to represent dairy farms. “1” represents farms where a majority of the farm’s gross income 
comes from its dairy operation. The same concept can be applied to the effect of a mainly poultry-
producing farm. 
Finally, we control for financial characteristics. We test for crop sales, CROPSHR, which is 
represented as a ratio of sales from crops as a portion of total farm sales (crops and livestock). This 
ratio serves as an indicator of the extent that the farm is specialized in crop production. The debt to 
asset ratio, RATIO, is used as indicator of leverage position. A larger debt-to-asset ratio is predicted 
to have a negative relationship with the dependent variable.  The ratio of the labor expenses over the 
annual gross farm income, LABOR, is another financial indicator observed for the model. Farm [6] 
 
expenses, ETOT, are an indicator of farm size. Mishra and El-Osta (2007) found that larger farms 
are more likely to have an appointed successor or have already transferred management. 
The variable means of two family-farm types, those where the older generation operator 
serves as primary operator and those where the younger generation operator serves as primary 
operator, are reported in Table 2. A mean-difference z-test was conducted to compare the means of 
the explanatory variables, along with several other farm characteristics, with respect to the two types 
of farms. A significant difference ensued for the following variables: work experience on the farm 
and household size for both the elder and younger generation operators, the education, gender, and 
off-farm work days of the younger generation operator, as well as the tenure of farm and whether it 
specializes in dairy. 
Young operators who serve as the primary operator have completed a significantly higher 
level of education than those that serve as secondary operator. This could be explained by the idea 
that the greater responsibilities associated with becoming a primary manager require more formal 
education. Additionally, some apprentices may serve as secondary operators while attending school. 
Also note, the age for both operators does not appear significant. This is a surprising find since 
other studies (Kimhi, 2001; Wolf, 2003) found operator age to be a significant explanatory variable 
in determining if a successor had been declared. Another interesting result of the mean-difference 
test is the difference in gender of the operators. According to the statistics, 30% of elder secondary 
operators are female, which is twice the number that is primary operators. This could be an 
indication that many surviving farm wives continue in a management role. Younger females appear 
much more likely to retain secondary status in farm management. 
 
Estimating Model 
We model the farm household’s utility derived from the choice of which generation has 
primary management responsibility as in equation (1) below,  
ij ij ij e X U            ( 1 )  
where i indexes families in the data and j indexes operators which can be assigned primacy in the 
management team. Xij is a vector of family, farm, and human capital characteristics and financial 
indicators, β is the estimated coefficient, and eij is the error term. As we do not observe utilities of the 
choice made or that foregone among operators, we need to convert the stochastic utility equation in 
(1) to a model that we can estimate with our data. Thus, we assume that if j are possible primary 
operators, the one observed is the utility maximizing one and using the inequality in (2) convert the 
model to a limited dependent variable.  
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Equation (4) estimates how family, farm, and financial characteristics influences the decision for the 
elder generation operator to resumes primacy in management decision (Y=1). The estimated logit 
model provides a set of probabilities for the decision and implementation to transfer management 
responsibilities of a family farm business with characteristics Xi. The magnitudes of the parameters, 
β, are not directly interpretable. Therefore, it is necessary to report the marginal effects of each 
variable. These effects are modeled as: 
 
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and can then be interpreted as follows: if the estimated marginal effect on variable x1 is k, then a one 




The logit model from equation (3) was used to analyze the effects of farm, financial, and 
family characteristics of family farm business on the probability that the elder generation operator 
remained as the primary management decision maker. Table 3 reports the results of the logit model. 
The first column reports the regression coefficients, and the last column reports the marginal effects 
of each characteristic on the dependent variable. The interpretation of the marginal effects is the 
amount that the probability that the older generation operator remains as the primary operator 
increases per unit of dependent variable increase. 
Consistent with our predictions, the age of the elder operator had a significant effect, at the 
1% level, on whether that operator remained as the primary manager. The age of the elder operator 
has a negative relationship with the probability that this operator is the primary operator. For 
example, with every year the elder generation operator gets older, they are 1.68 percent less likely to 
remain as the primary operator. As the elder generation operator gets older and approaches 
retirement, he becomes more aware of the need to pass off duties to his successor. When the age of 
the elder operator is graphed against the probability that the younger operator is the primary 
operator, Figure 2, we see there is a positive relationship. Thus an increase in the elder operator’s 
age, the more likely that operator has released managerial control to the succeeding operator. This 
relationship is also expected since elder farmers reaching retirement are more likely to start planning 
for the future of their farm. 
The work experience on the farm of the younger operator was also negatively related to the 
probability that the older operator remained as the primary manager at a significant level (at the 10% 
level). With every year of experience working on the farm, the younger operator is 0.12 percent 
more likely to have taken on the primary management responsibilities. This relationship can be 
explained by the idea that younger generation farmers who have been working on the farm for an 
extended amount of time experience some apprenticeship benefits prior to taking on management 
responsibilities (Westhead et. al., 2002). 
Another characteristic that increased the probability that the primary management 
responsibilities had been passed off to the younger generation operator was if the farm specialized as 
a dairy operation. If a majority of the farm’s gross income comes from its dairy operation, the [8] 
 
younger generation is 0.02 percent more likely to have taken over as primary manager. This is 
significant at the 5% level. Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) argue that parents have an incentive to 
declare a successor early due to the relatively large amount of work require for this type of 
operation. Also, dairy farms are more attractive to potential successors, as they tend to be a relatively 
stable and reliable source of income and that these farms are likely to remain specialized dairy farms 
in the future. (Wolf, 2003) Other types of farms may likely be considered, however poultry did not 
prove to be significant in this model.  
The model identified that off-farm work hours of the younger operator had a significant 
impact on whether the farm had transferred the primary management responsibilities. Significant at 
the 1% level, an increase in the off-farm work had a negative impact on the probability that the 
senior operator remained in control. In other words, if the younger operator worked off the farm 
more than 50 days a year, for at least four hours per day, they were 20.65 percent more likely to have 
taken a primary, decision-making role on the farm. The negative sign of the estimated coefficient 
was inconsistent with our predictions, but further consideration reveals that this relationship may be 
explained by a number of farms operations drawing income from other business ventures. 
The household size of the younger generation operator significantly affected which 
generation operator assumed the role of primary manager. The coefficient of the size of the younger 
operator’s household is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, as reported in 
Table 3, with every additional member of the young operator’s household, that operator is 0.20 
percent more likely to assume the primary management role.  
Other characteristics that were statistically significant in the model were the age of the 
younger operator, the household size of the elder operator, and the total expenses of the farm. The 
coefficient of the age of the younger operator was positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. This means that the younger operator’s age had a positive influence on the elder operator 
remaining in the primary management position. The marginal effect indicates that with every year 
the younger operator gets older, the younger operator is 0.81 percent more likely to remain in a 
secondary role (Figure 3). This is inconsistent with our prediction, however further investigation 
reveals the idea that the younger operator may have already pursued other career paths instead of 
investing in eventual transition of primary management. 
Using the results from the model, we can observe the changes in the probability that the 
younger operator is the primary operator with changes in the age of both operators. Figure 4 
illustrates the likelihood of the younger generation operator being primary operator against changes 
solely in the age of the elder generation operator, holding constant the gap between elder and 
younger operator ages. We now evaluate the age gap between the two operators at three different 
levels (20, 25, and 30 years). First note that as the age of elder operator increases, the probability that 
the younger operator assumes a primary role increases regardless of the age gap. When the elder 
generation operator approaches their mid-50s, they are more likely to have passed off managerial 
responsibilities when there is a 30 year age gap as opposed to a 20 year age discrepancy. However, as 
the elder generation operator reaches their 70s, the age gap between the two operators become less 
prevalent as the elder operator looks towards retirement. Thus, the age gap between the two 
operators is a more influencing factor earlier in the elder operator’s life than later.  
The household size of the elder operator was also positively related to the dependent 
variable. The coefficient was significant at the 5% level. We can interpret this variable by stating that 
an additional member in the elder operator’s household makes them 0.41 percent more likely to 
remain as primary manager. This indication may be a result of the fact that the operator’s family [9] 
 
depends on a steady and sufficient income. Plus, more household members may complicate the 
inheritance process and delay the choice a dynastic successor. 
The only financial indicator that proved statistically significant in the model was total cash 
expenses. The coefficient of total farm expenses was positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This means that increases in expenses increase the probability that the elder generation 
operator still controls a majority of the operations. The marginal effects suggest that with every 
thousand dollar increase in cash expenses, the older generation operator is 0.01 percent more likely 
to remain as the primary operator. 
 
Conclusions 
A growing literature in agricultural economics has surfaced to identify the determinants of 
family farm succession. This literature has well-established the importance of understanding the 
farm transfer decision for drawing relevant sector-level implications of farm structure (size and 
specialization) as well as the continued prevalence of farm household pluriactivity (Glauben, Tietje, 
and Weiss; Kimhi and Nachlieli; Mishra and El-Osta). While this literature has relied primarily on 
cross-sectional information and stated intentions of farmers to declare a family member a successor 
in management, it provides only limited guidance on the more general question of the optimality of 
succession with respect to timing (i.e. age of senior-most operator) and how it interacts with relative 
educational and farming experience of the younger generation in the intergenerational transfer of 
farm businesses. 
We use cross-sectional data from the USDA-ERS’ Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS), an annual survey of farm household activity (farm and non-farm earnings, business 
and household expenses, etc.) Using a typology of farm households (Keeney, Remble, Truax, 2010) 
we restrict our analysis to farms that currently have two operators (set apart by at least twenty years 
of age) and use characteristics of both operators in explaining our outcome variable. The outcome 
variable we key on is the generation (elder vs. younger) which has primary management 
responsibility for the farm as determined by response in the household survey. We estimate the 
probability of older generation primacy using a logit model and farm, family, and operator 
characteristics as the covariate. 
Results from comparing household, business, and financial characteristics of the two types 
of multi-generational farm businesses indicate some striking similarities and important differences 
(at the means) which will be useful in explaining the decision between generations for primary 
operator assignment. As expected, the age of both operators proved to be significantly different 
between the two types of farm groups. Further investigation revealed that the age gap between the 
two operators has a stronger influence before the elder operator reaches an age of retirement. We 
may attribute this behavior to the idea that senior farmers hand off responsibilities sooner to ensure 
farm continuation. Human capital and family characteristics, such as the work experience, off-farm 
work, and household size of the younger operator were statistically significant, though surprisingly 
the education of the elder and younger operators was not, despite the discrepancies in means. Of 
particular interest is the finding that an increase in off-farm work of the younger generation operator 
tends to increase the probability that they serve as primary manager. In terms of financial 
characteristics, we find that the only variable proved significant was household expenses. The 
differences in these significant variables point towards the decision to transfer primary operator 
status being influenced by family and human characteristics and less related to financial and farm 
characteristics.  [10] 
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Table 1: List and Description of Dependent Variables in the Model 
Variable  Description and Units 
OLDAGE  The age of the elder generation operator.
YNGAGE  The age of the younger generation operator.
OLDED  "1" if the elder generation completed a four-year college degree or more, "0" otherwise. 
YNGED  "1" if the younger generation completed a four-year college degree or more, "0" otherwise. 
YNGEXP  Years the younger generation operator has worked on the farm.
OLDOFF  "1" if the elder generation has worked 50 days or more at least 4 hours per day  in 2002, "0" 
otherwise. 
YNGOFF  "1" if the younger generation has worked 50 days or more at least 4 hours per day  in 2002, "0" 
otherwise. 
OLDHSIZE  Number of persons living in the elder generation's household.
YNGHSIZE  Number of persons living in the younger generation's household.
DDAIRY  "1" if the dairy operation represents the largest portion of gross annual income, "0" otherwise. 
DPOULTRY  "1" if the poultry operation represents the largest portion of gross annual income, "0" otherwise. 
CROPSHR  Ratio of crop sales over total sales (crop + livestock).
RATIO  Total debt to total asset ratio.  
ETOT  Total annual expenses. 


















Table 2: Reported Means and Z-Scores for Explanatory Variables 
VARIABLE  TYPE 4  TYPE 5  COMBINED  Z-Score 
Age   
Elder Operator  66 70.82 67.43 -1.28 
Younger Operator  37.87 43.04 39.4 -1.57 
Age Difference  28.13 27.78 28.03 0.22 
Work Experience on Farm   
Elder Operator  27.05 32.33 28.61 -1.66*** 
Younger Operator  12.71 17.46 14.12 -2.47* 
Education  
Elder Operator  0.26 0.16 0.23 1.18 
Younger Operator  0.21 0.46 0.29 -2.14** 
Gender   
Elder Operator  0.17 0.3 0.21 -0.91 
Younger Operator  0.23 0.07 0.18 1.98** 
Household Size   
Elder Operator  1.97 3.41 2.39 -4.02* 
Younger Operator  2.42 1.35 2.1 4.27* 
Off-Farm Work Days   
Elder Operator  0.32 0.19 0.28 1.38 
Younger Operator  0 0.68 0.2 -13.60* 
Crop Share  0.32 0.3 0.32 0.24 
Gross Farm Income  213393.97 195214.1 208000.2 0.35 
Net Farm Income  36051.3 30532.19 34413.84 0.38 
Total Expenditures  157.77 149.26 155.25 0.20 
Labor Expenditures  29524.99 16781.96 25744.28 1.02 
Value of Real Estate  734296.01 571724.4 686062.91 1.28 
Net Worth  884400.32 724732.7 837028.78 1.03 
Total Assets  984518.04 819143.6 935453.36 0.96 
Tenure 0.77 0.58 0.71 1.85*** 
Acres Operated  1140.01 852.47 1054.7 0.59 
Dairy Operation  0.1 0.06 0.09 1.79*** 













Table3: Logit Estimates of the Effect of Variables on the Probability of the Older Generation Resuming Primary 
Management Responsibility 
Variable Estimate   Marginal Effect 
Age    
Elder Operator  -0.10 *  -1.68 
Younger Operator  0.07 *  0.81 
Education    
Elder Operator  0.84   0.05 
Younger Operator  -0.15   -0.01 
Work Experience on Farm (Younger Operator)  -0.04 **  -0.12 
Household Size     
Elder Operator  0.81 *  0.41 
Younger Operator  -0.36 *  -0.20 
Off-Farm Work Days     
Elder Operator  0.31   0.02 
Younger Operator  -20.65 *  -0.96 
Dairy Operation  -0.87 *  -0.02 
Poultry Operation  0.02   0.00 
Crop Share  -0.55   -0.04 
Debt/Asset Ratio  -0.15   0.00 
Total Farm Expenditures  0.00 *  -0.01 
Labor Expenses  1.87   0.10 
Intercept  6.56 *  -- 
Notes: Author’s estimates using 2002 Agricultural Resource Management Survey Data. Estimates for which p <= 0.05 indicated by *, 
those falling within p = (0.05, 0.10] are indicated by **. Standard errors for estimates are calculated using the jackknife replicate weight 
estimator as detailed in Dubman (2000) and Kott (1998). (Marginal effects are calculated at sample means. Marginal effects for 

















































































































































































Older Operator's Age (Years)
Age Gap = 20
Age Gap = 25
Age Gap = 30